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SADDAM’S STRATEGY:
NO TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS; YES TO BIOLOGICALS
W. Andrew Terrill

Advocates of war with Iraq currently contend that Saddam Hussein is actively and
aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability much as he did prior to Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Very little evidence is presented to support
this argument, but the logic associated with it generally maintains that Saddam has a
capacity for developing illicit weapons in secret. The world was surprised by the postDESERT STORM revelations of a massive hidden nuclear weapons program by Iraq. If
Iraq fooled us once, could they not do so again?
The “better safe than sorry” argument nevertheless overlooks a variety of difficulties
that may make nuclear weapons a less desirable alternative for Saddam at this time.
Nuclear weapons development requires substantial financial resources, access to
technology, and the time to go through a series of stages in the nuclear weapons
production cycle. These issues were not major obstacles for Iraq prior to 1990. Baghdad
had legal access to a variety of nuclear technologies prior to DESERT STORM as the
result of its acceptance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The only drawback of
such membership was minor and required that Baghdad accept very nonintrusive
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These safeguards inspections
were easily deceived by the hidden weapons program. Additionally, Saddam could
supplement his legal purchases of nuclear technology by illegal purchases obtained
from countries with lackadaisical export-control laws and procedures. Western leaders
knew that Saddam had a powerful black market procurement network in Europe, but
they overlooked it because Saddam was fighting the fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini of
Iran from 1980-88. Saddam seems an important bulwark against virulent Iranian
nationalism.
In the aftermath of DESERT STORM, Saddam faced a completely new type of
inspections regime and huge new problems in purchasing nuclear technology abroad.
Inspections were now highly intrusive, and export controls were tightened throughout
many countries in the developed world. Additionally, post-war inspections identified
and eliminated more of Saddam’s nuclear infrastructure than was destroyed in combat,
creating the need for a nuclear weapons infrastructure to be developed again, almost
from scratch, if Iraq hoped to build its own nuclear weapons.
During years of post-war inspections Saddam appears to have given up on
maintaining much of his nuclear infrastructure. Instead, he sought to protect his
biological weapons facilities above all other assets. As the Head of the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM), Richard Butler noted the special protection given to
biological assets. Likewise, the defection of Saddam’s sons-in-law in 1995 led to a
treasure trove of information on biological weapons which Saddam attempted to keep
secret long after he gave up other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This trend of

stressing biologicals continues to be seen in the patterns of legal and illegal acquisitions
noted by the United Kingdom’s recent White Paper on Iraqi WMD. A great deal of
biological warfare related material has been obtained compared to only a trickle of
nuclear technology.
Stressing biological weapons over nuclear weapons is also logical for a dictator
concerned first and foremost about regime survival. A biological weapons capability is
more achievable in the short term. At 65 years old, Saddam has little interest in
weapons that promise regime protection in the distant future. Nuclear programs may
therefore have only a tangential claim on Iraqi resources. Saddam wants assets to
protect his regime now, not 10 years from now. Moreover, a biological program is much
more concealable to any country with a legitimate pharmaceutical industry.
When all else fails, the advocates of preemptive war suggest that Saddam may at
least be able to purchase special nuclear materials on the black market if he is unable to
produce them himself, and, that having such material, he could then produce a weapon.
This statement is true, but it can also be applied to all but the most impoverished of
countries. Ghana might be able to produce a nuclear weapon if it was able to buy
special nuclear material elsewhere. Such an action is very close to buying a finished
nuclear weapon. Moreover, no evidence has yet been placed before the U.S. public that
such a feat of smuggling has taken place.
Saddam Hussein’s apparent decision to emphasize biological weapons over nuclear
systems is of concern, but certainly of less concern than if he was close to developing a
strong nuclear capability. The reliability of biological weapons in combat are more in
doubt, while the opprobrium of a nation using these banned systems would be more
severe. Threatening neighbors with biological weapons would be more problematic
since no one really knows how useful they will be in combat. While Saddam’s
overwhelming interest in biological weapons cannot be dismissed, advocates of war
with Iraq might at least consider that Iraq is and will probably remain a non-nuclear
power for quite some time.
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